ERC-8004: Trustless Agents
Relevance: NoneNot one of the main personas on the ERC-8004: Trustless Agents page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Persona
Holds credentials, captures consent, issues tokens (Google Pay, PayPal, Coinbase).
Relevance levels: High, a main persona on the protocol page; Medium, owns, implements or verifies a step; Low, relies on or observes a step; None, no role found in the protocol page.
Not one of the main personas on the ERC-8004: Trustless Agents page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Not one of the main personas on the x402 page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Not one of the main personas on the Visa Trusted Agent Protocol page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Not one of the main personas on the Agentic Commerce Protocol (ACP) page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
The credential provider: writes a payment handler specification and issues opaque tokens to platforms. Source [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
A day in the life. Ana works on a wallet team that wants its button in agent checkouts. She writes a handler spec under the wallet's own domain, because dev.ucp is reserved, and a schema for the business config. Businesses add the handler to their profile with their merchant id. Platforms run the handler, get a token bound to the merchant and session, and pass it in payment.instruments. Ana never sees the checkout itself, and the business never sees the card number. Her open question is AP2: the extension lets a wallet sign mandates with a key bound to a payment credential, but she has not found a deployment that does it yet.
Not one of the main personas on the Stripe MPP (Machine Payments Protocol) page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Credential Provider: verifies Payment Mandates and issues a token scoped to the purchase; often also hosts the Trusted Surface. Source [6, 7, 8, 9]
A day in the life. Marco runs the agent payments team at a digital wallet. Each morning he reviews rejected presentations by error code. Most invalid_credential cases come from one agent provider whose closed mandates are signed with a rotated key that no longer matches cnf. The unresolved_constraint cases are mostly budget checks: his service is the one that has to remember earlier presentations, and the specification never said whose job that was. He files a note for the FIDO payments group about revocation, then adds a rule that invalidates outstanding tokens when the agent presents an overlapping mandate. The release goes out with ES256 keys only.
Not one of the main personas on the Mastercard Agent Pay page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.