Each protocol from this seat
Relevance levels: High, a main persona on the protocol page; Medium, owns, implements or verifies a step; Low, relies on or observes a step; None, no role found in the protocol page.
Not one of the main personas on the ERC-8004: Trustless Agents page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Not one of the main personas on the x402 page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Issues the Visa cards that VIC tokenizes for agents and decides on authorization, without seeing the TAP signature itself. Source [1, 2, 3, 4]
Goals
- Approve legitimate agent purchases
- Keep step-up and passkey checks effective
- Know which transactions an agent started
Pains
- No public agent transaction indicator from Visa
- No agent-specific liability rule
- Customers who dispute what their agent bought
Implements
- Step-up verification and passkey setup for agent tokens through VIC
- Risk rules for agent-specific tokens
- Agentic Ready participation
Must trust
- Visa's onboarding of agents
- Merchants and CDNs to verify TAP
- VIC confirmations as evidence in disputes
Questions they ask
- Can I tell a TAP-verified purchase in the authorization message?
- Who carries the loss when an agent misreads the user?
- What does the passkey approval prove in a dispute?
First three steps
- Join Visa's Agentic Ready program
- Review how VIC step-up and passkeys work for my cardholders
- Map agent token transactions in fraud monitoring
Metrics they care about
- Approval rate on agent tokens
- Fraud and dispute rate on agent purchases
- Passkey enrollment rate
A day in the life. Lena runs digital fraud at a European bank in the Agentic Ready program. Her cardholders now link cards to shopping agents: VIC runs step-up verification, the user sets up a passkey, and the agent gets its own token. When a purchase arrives she sees a token transaction, not the merchant's TAP check, so she relies on Visa's signals. A customer disputes a hotel booking made by an agent. The passkey approval of the Payment Instruction helps, but no agent-specific liability rule exists yet, so the case runs under the usual card rules.
Steps in the responsibility table
- Relies onOnboard the agent and register its key
- Relies onApprove the purchase instruction with a passkey (VIC)
- OwnsAuthorize the card payment
- OwnsHandle a dispute on an agent purchase
Not one of the main personas on the Agentic Commerce Protocol (ACP) page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Not one of the main personas on the UCP page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Not one of the main personas on the Stripe MPP (Machine Payments Protocol) page. The responsibility table gives this persona no step.
Card issuer or bank: may receive the Payment Mandate through the network or act as Credential Provider, and uses mandates as dispute evidence. Source [5, 6, 7]
Goals
- Know an agent purchase was user-approved
- Fewer first-party disputes
- Clear liability
Pains
- Liability stays with network rules that are not yet agent specific
- No step-up mechanism in v0.2
- Production evidence missing
Implements
- Mandate verification where it acts as Credential Provider or behind the network
- Dispute verification of mandates and receipts
- Risk decisions using risk_data
Must trust
- The network to pass mandates intact
- The Trusted Surface to have authenticated the user
- Receipts to be signed by the right parties
Questions they ask
- Does a mandate change chargeback rights?
- How do I challenge the user if v0.2 has no step-up?
- Who retains mandates for disputes?
First three steps
- Read the Dispute Evidence and Verification: Dispute sections
- Check how your network plans to carry mandates
- Decide how unresolved_constraint fallbacks reach your authentication flow
Metrics they care about
- Disputes with mandate evidence attached
- Approval rate on mandate-backed transactions
- Fallback rate to manual approval
A day in the life. Helen handles disputes at a regional bank. A customer says her agent bought the wrong concert tickets. The merchant supplies the Checkout Mandate and receipt, and the network passes the Payment Mandate. Helen's tool recomputes the hash of the checkout JWT, matches both receipt references and confirms that the agent's closed mandate sits inside the customer's open one, with the venue and price allowed. The evidence shows the agent stayed inside its limits, so the dispute turns on whether those limits matched what the customer meant. AP2 cannot answer that, and the network rules say nothing specific about agents yet. She escalates it.
Steps in the responsibility table
- VerifiesVerify the Payment Mandate and issue a token
- OwnsVerify mandates and receipts in a dispute
- ImplementsSet retention and consent policy
Issues the card behind the agentic token, is enabled for Agent Pay at network level, and makes the final authorization decision. Source [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
Goals
- Approve good agent purchases without extra friction
- See clearly when an agent was involved
- Keep fraud and dispute rates flat as agent traffic grows
Pains
- No published agent-specific reason codes or liability shift
- Agent flags that are not always present, hence the 2026-09-30 probability score test
- Verifiable Intent evidence that is not yet documented inside live authorizations
Implements
- Network-level enablement for Agent Pay
- Passkey authentication for consumer consent where offered
- Authorization rules that read the additional information in the message
Must trust
- Mastercard to register and certify agents
- The network to detokenize and enforce token limits
- The agent platform to capture the consumer intent accurately
Questions they ask
- Which data element tells me an agent initiated this transaction?
- Who carries the loss when an agent buys the wrong thing within its limits?
- Can I read a Verifiable Intent chain today, or only later?
First three steps
- Confirm with Mastercard that your BINs are enabled for Agent Pay
- Map how agent transactions appear in your authorization and dispute systems
- Read the Verifiable Intent security model and its dispute evidence section
Metrics they care about
- Agent transaction approval rate
- Fraud and dispute rate on agent transactions
- Share of agent transactions that carry reliable agent information
A day in the life. Priya runs card authorization strategy at a mid-sized European bank. On 2026-06-02 Mastercard said all its European issuers were enabled for Agent Pay at network level, so agent transactions may already reach her systems. She wants to approve them without new friction, but her dispute team asks a hard question: when a cardholder says the agent bought the wrong hotel, which reason code applies? Nothing agent-specific is published. She asks Mastercard which message field marks agent involvement, sets a rule to review those transactions separately for a quarter, and reads the Verifiable Intent dispute evidence section to see what proof she could ask for later.
Steps in the responsibility table
- Relies onAuthenticate consumer and set limits
- Relies onProvision agentic token
- Relies onDetokenize and check token limits
- Relies onVerify Verifiable Intent chain
- OwnsApprove or decline
- OwnsHandle dispute